DWA 227 · Week 7 · Tue Oct 6, 2026
Autocracy, Inc.
Kleptocracy and global finance
| Text | Question | Key term |
| Hirschman 1970, ch. 1 | What can members of a declining organization do? | exit, voice |
| Sharafutdinova & Dawisha 2017 | Why did Russia’s asset-holders not lobby for the rule of law? | institutional arbitrage |
| Applebaum 2024, Introduction, chs. 1–2 | What connects today’s autocracies? | “Autocracy, Inc.” |
| Olson 1993 (Week 4) | What should a ruler with a stake in his domain do? | stationary bandit |
Opening · Pistor 2013 (not assigned)
Law in the hierarchy of finance
“…the binding nature of legal and contractual commitments tends to be inversely related to the hierarchy of finance: Law tends to be binding on the periphery and relatively more elastic at the apex of the financial system.”p. 317
Apex
“This law-finance paradox tends to be resolved by suspending the full force of law where the survival of the system is at stake; that is, at its apex. It is here that power becomes salient.” (p. 315)
“major financial intermediaries received emergency liquidity support from the Fed or government bailouts” (p. 320)
Periphery
“It is thus at the periphery where default is most likely to result in involuntary exit.” (p. 320)
“homeowners faced personal bankruptcy and foreclosure in accordance with the law” (p. 320)
Part I · Hirschman 1970: 4
Two responses to decline

Albert O. Hirschman, 1945 · U.S. Army photograph (Sgt. Charles James), public domain
Exit
“(1) Some customers stop buying the firm’s products or some members leave the organization: this is the exit option. As a result, revenues drop, membership declines, and management is impelled to search for ways and means to correct whatever faults have led to exit.”
Voice
“(2) The firm’s customers or the organization’s members express their dissatisfaction directly to management or to some other authority to which management is subordinate or through general protest addressed to anyone who cares to listen: this is the voice option.”
Part I · Hirschman 1970
Economics and politics
- “a more fundamental schism: that between economics and politics. Exit belongs to the former realm, voice to the latter.” (p. 15)
- “Voice is political action par excellence.” (p. 16)
- Exit in politics: “branded as criminal, for it has been labeled desertion, defection, and treason.” (p. 17)
- Voice is used “whenever the exit option is unavailable” (p. 33, quoted in Sharafutdinova & Dawisha 2017: 363)

Monday demonstration, Leipzig, 23 October 1989 · Bundesarchiv, Bild 183-1989-1023-022 / Friedrich Gahlbeck, CC BY-SA 3.0 DE
Part I · Hirschman 1978 (not assigned)
Exit from the state
“Still, the principal weapon is wielded by the country’s own citizens—particularly of course by the more opulent ones among them—as they engage in capital flight on a massive scale whenever they feel threatened by domestic developments.”Hirschman 1978: 100

Credit Suisse building, Paradeplatz, Zürich, 2011 · Dietmar Rabich / Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 4.0
Part II · Sharafutdinova & Dawisha 2017
Stationary bandits and Russia’s billionaires
“As Olson argued, stationary bandits have a stake in seeing their sovereign dominion grow and prosper and therefore they tax less, commit more credibly, and provide other public goods…”p. 362, citing Olson 2000
“Despite the growth in the number of billionaires in Russia, however, institutional quality only worsened and the cronyism within the executive branch increased.”p. 362
- “35 percent of the country’s wealth is controlled by 100 or so oligarchs” (p. 365)

Moscow Exchange, main building, 2013 · Fitiss / Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 3.0
Part II · Sharafutdinova & Dawisha 2017
Institutional arbitrage
“…business elites take advantage of weak institutions at home to make profits, while using strong institutions abroad to safeguard them. We call this phenomenon institutional arbitrage.”p. 363
- “when exit is available at a relatively low cost, actors will choose it over voice” (pp. 363–64)
- “The cost of voice in such countries—a defining characteristic of authoritarian regimes—far exceeds the cost of exit.” (p. 364)

Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland, Lausanne, 2008 · Archipat / Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 3.0 (cropped)
Part II · Sharafutdinova & Dawisha 2017: 366–67
Capital leaving Russia
$782.5 bn
licit and illicit outflows, 1994–2011; “about $43.5 billion annually, on average”
70–90%
of Russian companies “formally belong to companies registered in offshore zones”
100,000
offshore companies by the 2000s, up from 50,000–60,000 in the late 1990s
14,400
Cyprus: home to “approximately 14,400 Russian companies”

Limassol Marina, Cyprus, 2017 · A. Savin / Wikimedia Commons, Free Art License (cropped)
Part II · Sharafutdinova & Dawisha 2017: 367, Table 1
Russia’s foreign direct investment by partner, 2009–2013
From Russia to partner, % of totalFrom partner to Russia, % of total
- A Moscow bank analyst: “most of Cyprus’ Russia-bound investments are nothing other than Russian oligarchs’ capital that was shipped overseas during the turbulent period of the ’90s.” (p. 368)
- In the text: “Cyprus alone accounts for around 35–40 percent of annual outward investments from Russia” (p. 367)
Part II · Sharafutdinova & Dawisha 2017: 367–70
Round-tripping
- “‘Round-tripping’ capital, i.e., when funds are transferred abroad first and then brought back into the country as foreign investment, is an important example of institutional arbitrage.” (p. 368)
Part II · Sharafutdinova & Dawisha 2017
London: courts, contracts, property
- London Court of International Arbitration, London Commercial Court, Stockholm: “the most popular destinations” for dispute resolution (p. 369)
- Berezovsky v. Abramovich, 2008–2012 · Cherney v. Deripaska, 2006–2012 (Table 3, p. 370)
- “Most of the cases in the list are about the ownership of significant Russian domestic assets with no direct relationship to England.” (p. 370)
- Commercial transactions “in contracts governed by English law” (p. 370)
- London, 2006: “a fifth of all the prime real estate sold for above £8 million was bought by Russian buyers” (p. 367)

The Rolls Building, London: Royal Courts of Justice, Business and Property Courts, 2021 · Roger Green / Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 4.0
Part II · Sharafutdinova & Dawisha 2017
“The best of both worlds”
“These business elites that take advantage of weak institutions at home for profit maximization rely on the best of both worlds—secure institutions in the West to protect profits over the long term and weak institutions in Russia to get super-profits in the short term.”p. 369
“‘A chicken can exercise ownership of eggs,’ he said, ‘and it can get fed while it’s sitting on the egg. But it’s not really their egg.’”Putin, as reported by Myers and Becker 2014, quoted on p. 371

Vladimir Putin at the congress of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, 17 December 2021 · kremlin.ru, CC BY 4.0
For the owner of a large Russian firm in 2010, list the costs of voice and the costs of exit.
Part II · Logvinenko 2019 (not assigned)
Asset control and foreign ownership
“Each episode follows the same pattern: powerful domestic business interests at first opposed foreign ownership, while they sought to lock in control over the contested properties. Once they gained outright control, the winning group changed its posture and began favoring financial openness policies that made it easier for non-resident investors to obtain minority ownership stakes in their companies.”p. 696
Part II · Logvinenko 2019 (not assigned) · Table 1, p. 712
Three episodes, 1992–2006
| Episode | Winning group | Supported before ownership settled | Supported after ownership settled |
| Voucher privatization, 1992–94 | Insider-managers | July 1992 amendments to disqualify outside investors | New rules for foreign investment accounts; the stock market in 1994 |
| “Loans for shares,” 1995–96 | Private oligarchs | Informal agreement to bar foreign investors | International Monetary Fund Article 8; listing of depositary receipts; the 1996–98 stock market boom |
| Nationalizations of Yukos and Gazprom, 2002–06 | “Stoligarchs”; ruling political elite | Delay of financial openness reforms; the “ring fence” on Gazprom shares kept | Financial openness reforms of 2006; “ring fence” removed; Rosneft offering in London |
Part II · Logvinenko 2019 (not assigned) · Figure 2
Rule of law and foreign ownership restrictions, 1997–2006
Part II · Logvinenko 2019 (not assigned) · pp. 709–10
Financial openness after 2006
- 2006“non-residents could invest in Russian domestic securities without restrictions”
- 2006Rosneft offering on the London Stock Exchange: “over $10 billion”
- 2004–05 → 2006Portfolio inflows: “on the order of $1 billion” → $14.3 billion
- 2012–2017Moscow Exchange joins “the two biggest international clearinghouses”; Sponsored Market Access
- 2003 → 2011Billionaires in Russia: 17 → 95
Part II · Record since 2022 · Forbes counts
Billionaires in Russia, 2000–2026
As cited in Logvinenko 2019Forbes Russia count
- Combined wealth, Forbes Russia count: $353 bn (2022) · $695.5 bn (2026)
Part II · Record since 2022
Capital controls since February 2022
- 28 Feb 2022Decree 79: exporters sell 80% of foreign-currency revenue; Bank of Russia halts securities sales by non-residents
- 3 Mar 2022London Stock Exchange halts trading in 27 Russian companies
- 5 Mar 2022Decree 95: payments to “unfriendly” foreign creditors go to restricted “type C” accounts
- 12–13 Jun 2024United States sanctions the Moscow Exchange; exchange trading in dollars and euros stops
- 1 Jun 2026Bank of Russia extends the ban on transfers abroad by “unfriendly” non-residents to 7 Dec 2026
Part II · Record since 2022
Capital and investors, 2021–2023
$72 bn → $227 bn
net private capital outflow, 2021 → 2022Bank of Russia
“about half”
foreign investors’ share of trading volume on the Moscow stock exchange before the invasionBOFIT
“around 80 %”
private individuals’ share of trading on the Moscow stock exchange since the invasionBOFIT
Part II · Record since 2022
Bank of Russia reserves immobilized abroad
≈ $300 bn
immobilized worldwide
€210 bn
in the European Union
€185 bn
at Euroclear, Brussels
- 12 Dec 2025European Union immobilizes the assets indefinitely
- 18–19 Dec 2025Reparations loan not agreed; €90 bn joint-borrowing loan to Ukraine by 24 member states
- 15 May 2026Moscow Arbitration Court grants in full the Bank of Russia’s €200.1 bn claim against Euroclear
Part II · Record since 2022
State seizures of private companies in Russia, 2022–2026
Confiscation cases initiated by prosecutors
- Assets targeted for seizure, early 2022 to late 2025: over 4.99 trillion rubles, about $58 bn
- Rolf, car dealer: state management (2023) · Domodedovo airport (2025) · Rusagro: court order (2026)
- Law signed 10 Jun 2026: 10-year limit on privatization claims; anti-corruption, anti-terrorism and anti-extremism claims exempt
Part II · Record since 2022
Offshore centres and enforcement, 2022–2026
| Place | Record | Source |
| Cyprus | Russian deposits in Cypriot banks “fell 76% from 2014 to 2022” · “Cyprus Confidential,” Nov 2023: nearly 800 companies and trusts owned by Russians sanctioned since 2014 | Euronews, 24 Jan 2024; ICIJ |
| Russia | Law 470-FZ, 4 Aug 2023: courts may suspend the rights of foreign holding companies in Russian firms · X5 Retail Group, 25 Apr 2024 | Cleary Gottlieb; Reuters |
| Dubai | Russians bought $6.3 bn of property after the February 2022 invasion | EU Tax Observatory, May 2024 |
| United Kingdom | £28.7 bn frozen under the Russia sanctions regime, as of May 2025 | OFSI Annual Review 2024–25 |
| United States | Task Force KleptoCapture disbanded, 5 Feb 2025 · ownership reporting ended for U.S. companies, final rule 11 Aug 2026 | Ballard Spahr; Davis Polk |
Part III · Applebaum 2024, Introduction
“Nowadays, autocracies are run not by one bad guy but by sophisticated networks relying on kleptocratic financial structures, a complex of security services—military, paramilitary, police—and technological experts who provide surveillance, propaganda, and disinformation.”

Anne Applebaum, Frankfurt Book Fair, October 2024 · Elena Ternovaja / Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 3.0
Part III · Applebaum 2024, Introduction
Members named in the Introduction
Russia
China
Iran
North Korea
Venezuela
Nicaragua
Angola
Myanmar
Cuba
Syria
Zimbabwe
Mali
Belarus
Sudan
Azerbaijan
- “and perhaps three dozen others”
- “…not like a bloc but rather like an agglomeration of companies, bound not by ideology but rather by a ruthless, single-minded determination to preserve their personal wealth and power: Autocracy, Inc.”

Xi Jinping and other leaders at China’s Victory Day parade, Beijing, 3 September 2025 · kremlin.ru, CC BY 4.0
Part III · Applebaum 2024, Introduction
“not through ideals but through deals”
- Belarus: “More than two dozen Chinese companies have invested money”; in 2020 “Russia sent Russian journalists to replace” Belarusian journalists who “refused to report a false election result”
Part III · Applebaum 2024, Introduction and chs. 1–2
Kleptocracy
- “Russia plays a special role in the autocratic network, both as the inventor of the modern marriage of kleptocracy and dictatorship and as the country most aggressively seeking to upend the status quo.”
- “An influx of kleptocratic cash can also empower regimes to become more autocratic and repressive.”
- Ch. 1: February 1970, West German and Soviet officials conclude the agreement for “the first gas pipelines from the U.S.S.R. to Western Europe”; Wandel durch Handel, “change through trade”
- “Autocracy, Inc., offers its members not only money and security but also something less tangible: impunity.”
Synthesis
The texts, this week’s cases
| Text | Key term | Cases this week |
| Olson 1993 | stationary bandit | Russia’s new owners after the 1990s |
| Hirschman 1970 | exit, voice | firms, organizations, states |
| Sharafutdinova & Dawisha 2017 | institutional arbitrage | Russia: Cyprus, the British Virgin Islands, London courts and property |
| Applebaum 2024 | “not through ideals but through deals”; impunity | Venezuela, Belarus |
Midterm review
Blue-book midterm · Thursday, October 8
10 × 1
multiple-choice questions, from the twenty terms
2 × 2.5
essays, two of the four in the study guide
1 page
of handwritten notes allowed
Coverage: Weeks 1–7 Core readings and lectures
Midterm review · study guide, Part A
Twenty terms
| Week | Terms |
| 1 · Where the world stands | 1 Regimes of the World and “back to 1978” · 2 The third wave of autocratization · 3 The End of History · 4 “Democracy’s Surprising Resilience” |
| 2 · Globalization and its discontents | 5 The gold standard and the “Cross of Gold” · 6 Polanyi · 7 “The Myth of the Global” · 8 Xi at Davos |
| 3 · Classifying nondemocracies | 9 Linz and Stepan’s regime types · 10 Pei’s China |
| 4 · Capitalism under democracy and dictatorship | 11 Friedman · 12 Olson’s stationary bandit · 13 The Narrow Corridor · 14 The dictator’s GDP |
| 5 · Spin in practice | 15 Spin dictatorship · 16 Ketman · 17 “The New Propaganda War” |
| 6 · Africa | 18 Coups as a symptom, not cause |
| 7 · Autocracy, Inc. | 19 Autocracy, Inc. · 20 Exit, voice, and institutional arbitrage |
Midterm review · study guide, terms 1 and 9
Two classifications
| V-Dem, Regimes of the World | Linz and Stepan 1996 |
| Types | closed autocracy · electoral autocracy · electoral democracy · liberal democracy | democracy · authoritarianism · totalitarianism · post-totalitarianism · sultanism |
| Dimensions | free and fair multiparty elections; a winner constrained by courts, legislature, and protected rights | pluralism · ideology · mobilization · leadership |
| Figure | electoral autocracy: 3.8 billion people | without the two added types, more than 90 percent of nondemocracies in one box |
Midterm review · study guide, terms 11–14
Capitalism, order, and growth
| Text | Claim | Detail |
| Friedman 1962 | markets separate economic power from political power | capitalism: necessary, not sufficient, for political freedom |
| Olson 1993 | a stationary bandit has an “encompassing interest” in his domain’s output | short time horizon; succession |
| Acemoglu & Robinson | liberty needs a strong state and a society able to shackle it | Red Queen: both must keep running |
| Martínez 2022 | reported GDP against night-time lights | autocracies overstate yearly growth by about 35 percent |
Midterm review · study guide, Part B
Four essay questions
- Explain the logic of a spin dictatorship. Why would a dictator give up mass violence, and under what conditions does spin work better than fear? Apply the model to one case it fits and one case it does not.terms 9, 10, 15–17
- What is the nature of economic growth under dictatorship?terms 10–15
- Has globalization made autocracy weaker or stronger?terms 1, 3, 4, 6, 8, 15, 17, 19, 20
- Are Africa’s recent coups evidence that Africans are turning against democracy?terms 1, 4, 17, 18
- Two of these four will be on the exam and you will answer both. Each answer: about 2–3 paragraphs.
Midterm review
Outline one answer
Pairs · 5 minutes: choose one of the four questions. Write a four-line outline. Name the readings and one piece of evidence for each line.
Next
Thursday and after
- Thu Oct 8Blue-book midterm, in class
- Tue Oct 13No class
- Oct 15–16Fall Break
- Sun Oct 18Connector/Applier posts on today’s readings due in the shared doc; moved from Wed Oct 7 because of the midterm
- Oct 20 & 22Digital Authoritarianism & Surveillance; Tuesday opens with a short midterm debrief
- Week of Oct 22Guest by Zoom: Sarah Hummel (Harvard), information technology and autocracy
- Thu Oct 22Book review due
Extra · Depth · Logvinenko 2021
Global Finance, Local Control
“…financial internationalization allowed local elites to raise capital from foreign investors while maintaining control over local assets. They legitimized their wealth using Western institutions, but they did so on their terms.”
“…without strong domestic rule-of-law protections, financial internationalization entrenches oligarchic capitalism and strengthens authoritarian regimes.”
- Sharafutdinova & Dawisha 2017, n. 25: “For an extension of this argument linking capital mobility and authoritarianism, see Logvinenko 2013.”
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