DWA 227 · Week 7 · Tue Oct 6, 2026

Autocracy, Inc.

Kleptocracy and global finance
TextQuestionKey term
Hirschman 1970, ch. 1What can members of a declining organization do?exit, voice
Sharafutdinova & Dawisha 2017Why did Russia’s asset-holders not lobby for the rule of law?institutional arbitrage
Applebaum 2024, Introduction, chs. 1–2What connects today’s autocracies?“Autocracy, Inc.”
Olson 1993 (Week 4)What should a ruler with a stake in his domain do?stationary bandit
Opening · Pistor 2013 (not assigned)

Law in the hierarchy of finance

“…the binding nature of legal and contractual commitments tends to be inversely related to the hierarchy of finance: Law tends to be binding on the periphery and relatively more elastic at the apex of the financial system.”p. 317
Apex
“This law-finance paradox tends to be resolved by suspending the full force of law where the survival of the system is at stake; that is, at its apex. It is here that power becomes salient.” (p. 315)
“major financial intermediaries received emergency liquidity support from the Fed or government bailouts” (p. 320)
Periphery
“It is thus at the periphery where default is most likely to result in involuntary exit.” (p. 320)
“homeowners faced personal bankruptcy and foreclosure in accordance with the law” (p. 320)
Opening · Global estimates, 2009–2026

Illicit finance: scale and location

2–5%
of global GDP laundered per year, or $800 billion–$2 trillionUNODC
$4.4 tn
“in illicit funds flowed through the global financial system in 2025”Nasdaq Verafin · industry estimate
$13 tn
household financial wealth held offshore, 2023EU Tax Observatory
< 1%
of global illicit financial flows “currently seized and frozen”UNODC 2011
Offshore household wealth by host centre, 2023 · $ bn
Financial Secrecy Index 2026 · top four of 141
1United States
2Switzerland
3Singapore
4Hong Kong
FATF lists · 19 June 2026
Call for action (3) · North Korea · Iran · Myanmar
Increased monitoring (22) · Angola · Bolivia · Bosnia and Herzegovina · Bulgaria · Cameroon · Côte d’Ivoire · DR Congo · Haiti · Iraq · Kenya · Kuwait · Lao PDR · Lebanon · Monaco · Nepal · Papua New Guinea · South Sudan · Syria · Venezuela · Vietnam · Virgin Islands (UK) · Yemen
Part I · Hirschman 1970: 4

Two responses to decline

Albert O. Hirschman in 1945
Albert O. Hirschman, 1945 · U.S. Army photograph (Sgt. Charles James), public domain
Exit
“(1) Some customers stop buying the firm’s products or some members leave the organization: this is the exit option. As a result, revenues drop, membership declines, and management is impelled to search for ways and means to correct whatever faults have led to exit.”
Voice
“(2) The firm’s customers or the organization’s members express their dissatisfaction directly to management or to some other authority to which management is subordinate or through general protest addressed to anyone who cares to listen: this is the voice option.”
Part I · Hirschman 1970

Economics and politics

  • “a more fundamental schism: that between economics and politics. Exit belongs to the former realm, voice to the latter.” (p. 15)
  • “Voice is political action par excellence.” (p. 16)
  • Exit in politics: “branded as criminal, for it has been labeled desertion, defection, and treason.” (p. 17)
  • Voice is used “whenever the exit option is unavailable” (p. 33, quoted in Sharafutdinova & Dawisha 2017: 363)
Monday demonstration in Leipzig, 23 October 1989
Monday demonstration, Leipzig, 23 October 1989 · Bundesarchiv, Bild 183-1989-1023-022 / Friedrich Gahlbeck, CC BY-SA 3.0 DE
Part I · Hirschman 1978 (not assigned)

Exit from the state

“Still, the principal weapon is wielded by the country’s own citizens—particularly of course by the more opulent ones among them—as they engage in capital flight on a massive scale whenever they feel threatened by domestic developments.”Hirschman 1978: 100
Bank building on Paradeplatz, Zürich
Credit Suisse building, Paradeplatz, Zürich, 2011 · Dietmar Rabich / Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 4.0
Part II · Sharafutdinova & Dawisha 2017

Stationary bandits and Russia’s billionaires

“As Olson argued, stationary bandits have a stake in seeing their sovereign dominion grow and prosper and therefore they tax less, commit more credibly, and provide other public goods…”p. 362, citing Olson 2000
“Despite the growth in the number of billionaires in Russia, however, institutional quality only worsened and the cronyism within the executive branch increased.”p. 362
  • “35 percent of the country’s wealth is controlled by 100 or so oligarchs” (p. 365)
Moscow Exchange main building
Moscow Exchange, main building, 2013 · Fitiss / Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 3.0
Part II · Sharafutdinova & Dawisha 2017

Institutional arbitrage

“…business elites take advantage of weak institutions at home to make profits, while using strong institutions abroad to safeguard them. We call this phenomenon institutional arbitrage.”p. 363
  • “when exit is available at a relatively low cost, actors will choose it over voice” (pp. 363–64)
  • “The cost of voice in such countries—a defining characteristic of authoritarian regimes—far exceeds the cost of exit.” (p. 364)
Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland, Lausanne
Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland, Lausanne, 2008 · Archipat / Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 3.0 (cropped)
Part II · Sharafutdinova & Dawisha 2017: 366–67

Capital leaving Russia

$782.5 bn
licit and illicit outflows, 1994–2011; “about $43.5 billion annually, on average”
70–90%
of Russian companies “formally belong to companies registered in offshore zones”
100,000
offshore companies by the 2000s, up from 50,000–60,000 in the late 1990s
14,400
Cyprus: home to “approximately 14,400 Russian companies”
Part II · Sharafutdinova & Dawisha 2017: 367, Table 1

Russia’s foreign direct investment by partner, 2009–2013

From Russia to partner, % of totalFrom partner to Russia, % of total
Part II · video · 60 Minutes (not assigned)

Cyprus: A hiding spot for Russian money

▶  youtube.com/watch?v=kZnU60zLMxw

Part II · Sharafutdinova & Dawisha 2017: 367–70

Round-tripping

Part II · Sharafutdinova & Dawisha 2017

London: courts, contracts, property

  • London Court of International Arbitration, London Commercial Court, Stockholm: “the most popular destinations” for dispute resolution (p. 369)
  • Berezovsky v. Abramovich, 2008–2012 · Cherney v. Deripaska, 2006–2012 (Table 3, p. 370)
  • “Most of the cases in the list are about the ownership of significant Russian domestic assets with no direct relationship to England.” (p. 370)
  • Commercial transactions “in contracts governed by English law” (p. 370)
  • London, 2006: “a fifth of all the prime real estate sold for above £8 million was bought by Russian buyers” (p. 367)
The Rolls Building, London
The Rolls Building, London: Royal Courts of Justice, Business and Property Courts, 2021 · Roger Green / Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 4.0
Part II · Sharafutdinova & Dawisha 2017

“The best of both worlds”

“These business elites that take advantage of weak institutions at home for profit maximization rely on the best of both worlds—secure institutions in the West to protect profits over the long term and weak institutions in Russia to get super-profits in the short term.”p. 369
“‘A chicken can exercise ownership of eggs,’ he said, ‘and it can get fed while it’s sitting on the egg. But it’s not really their egg.’”Putin, as reported by Myers and Becker 2014, quoted on p. 371
Vladimir Putin at the RSPP congress, 2021
Vladimir Putin at the congress of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, 17 December 2021 · kremlin.ru, CC BY 4.0
For the owner of a large Russian firm in 2010, list the costs of voice and the costs of exit.
Part II · Logvinenko 2019 (not assigned)

Asset control and foreign ownership

“Each episode follows the same pattern: powerful domestic business interests at first opposed foreign ownership, while they sought to lock in control over the contested properties. Once they gained outright control, the winning group changed its posture and began favoring financial openness policies that made it easier for non-resident investors to obtain minority ownership stakes in their companies.”p. 696
Part II · Logvinenko 2019 (not assigned) · Table 1, p. 712

Three episodes, 1992–2006

EpisodeWinning groupSupported before ownership settledSupported after ownership settled
Voucher privatization, 1992–94Insider-managersJuly 1992 amendments to disqualify outside investorsNew rules for foreign investment accounts; the stock market in 1994
“Loans for shares,” 1995–96Private oligarchsInformal agreement to bar foreign investorsInternational Monetary Fund Article 8; listing of depositary receipts; the 1996–98 stock market boom
Nationalizations of Yukos and Gazprom, 2002–06“Stoligarchs”; ruling political eliteDelay of financial openness reforms; the “ring fence” on Gazprom shares keptFinancial openness reforms of 2006; “ring fence” removed; Rosneft offering in London
Part II · Logvinenko 2019 (not assigned) · Figure 2

Rule of law and foreign ownership restrictions, 1997–2006

Rule of law and foreign ownership restrictions on equities in Russia, 1997 to 2006
Part II · Logvinenko 2019 (not assigned) · pp. 709–10

Financial openness after 2006

Part II · Record since 2022 · Forbes counts

Billionaires in Russia, 2000–2026

As cited in Logvinenko 2019Forbes Russia count
Part II · Record since 2022

Capital controls since February 2022

Part II · Record since 2022

Capital and investors, 2021–2023

$72 bn → $227 bn
net private capital outflow, 2021 → 2022Bank of Russia
“about half”
foreign investors’ share of trading volume on the Moscow stock exchange before the invasionBOFIT
“around 80 %”
private individuals’ share of trading on the Moscow stock exchange since the invasionBOFIT
Part II · Record since 2022

Bank of Russia reserves immobilized abroad

≈ $300 bn
immobilized worldwide
€210 bn
in the European Union
€185 bn
at Euroclear, Brussels
Part II · Record since 2022

State seizures of private companies in Russia, 2022–2026

Confiscation cases initiated by prosecutors
  • Assets targeted for seizure, early 2022 to late 2025: over 4.99 trillion rubles, about $58 bn
  • Rolf, car dealer: state management (2023) · Domodedovo airport (2025) · Rusagro: court order (2026)
  • Law signed 10 Jun 2026: 10-year limit on privatization claims; anti-corruption, anti-terrorism and anti-extremism claims exempt
Part II · Record since 2022

Offshore centres and enforcement, 2022–2026

PlaceRecordSource
CyprusRussian deposits in Cypriot banks “fell 76% from 2014 to 2022” · “Cyprus Confidential,” Nov 2023: nearly 800 companies and trusts owned by Russians sanctioned since 2014Euronews, 24 Jan 2024; ICIJ
RussiaLaw 470-FZ, 4 Aug 2023: courts may suspend the rights of foreign holding companies in Russian firms · X5 Retail Group, 25 Apr 2024Cleary Gottlieb; Reuters
DubaiRussians bought $6.3 bn of property after the February 2022 invasionEU Tax Observatory, May 2024
United Kingdom£28.7 bn frozen under the Russia sanctions regime, as of May 2025OFSI Annual Review 2024–25
United StatesTask Force KleptoCapture disbanded, 5 Feb 2025 · ownership reporting ended for U.S. companies, final rule 11 Aug 2026Ballard Spahr; Davis Polk
Part III · Applebaum 2024, Introduction
“Nowadays, autocracies are run not by one bad guy but by sophisticated networks relying on kleptocratic financial structures, a complex of security services—military, paramilitary, police—and technological experts who provide surveillance, propaganda, and disinformation.”
Anne Applebaum, 2024
Anne Applebaum, Frankfurt Book Fair, October 2024 · Elena Ternovaja / Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 3.0
Part III · Applebaum 2024, Introduction

Members named in the Introduction

Russia
China
Iran
North Korea
Venezuela
Nicaragua
Angola
Myanmar
Cuba
Syria
Zimbabwe
Mali
Belarus
Sudan
Azerbaijan
  • “and perhaps three dozen others”
  • “…not like a bloc but rather like an agglomeration of companies, bound not by ideology but rather by a ruthless, single-minded determination to preserve their personal wealth and power: Autocracy, Inc.”
Leaders at the Victory Day parade in Beijing, 3 September 2025
Xi Jinping and other leaders at China’s Victory Day parade, Beijing, 3 September 2025 · kremlin.ru, CC BY 4.0
Part III · Applebaum 2024, Introduction

“not through ideals but through deals”

Part III · Applebaum 2024, Introduction and chs. 1–2

Kleptocracy

Synthesis

The texts, this week’s cases

TextKey termCases this week
Olson 1993stationary banditRussia’s new owners after the 1990s
Hirschman 1970exit, voicefirms, organizations, states
Sharafutdinova & Dawisha 2017institutional arbitrageRussia: Cyprus, the British Virgin Islands, London courts and property
Applebaum 2024“not through ideals but through deals”; impunityVenezuela, Belarus
Midterm review

Blue-book midterm · Thursday, October 8

15
points
10 × 1
multiple-choice questions, from the twenty terms
2 × 2.5
essays, two of the four in the study guide
1 page
of handwritten notes allowed
Coverage: Weeks 1–7 Core readings and lectures
Midterm review · study guide, Part A

Twenty terms

WeekTerms
1 · Where the world stands1 Regimes of the World and “back to 1978” · 2 The third wave of autocratization · 3 The End of History · 4 “Democracy’s Surprising Resilience”
2 · Globalization and its discontents5 The gold standard and the “Cross of Gold” · 6 Polanyi · 7 “The Myth of the Global” · 8 Xi at Davos
3 · Classifying nondemocracies9 Linz and Stepan’s regime types · 10 Pei’s China
4 · Capitalism under democracy and dictatorship11 Friedman · 12 Olson’s stationary bandit · 13 The Narrow Corridor · 14 The dictator’s GDP
5 · Spin in practice15 Spin dictatorship · 16 Ketman · 17 “The New Propaganda War”
6 · Africa18 Coups as a symptom, not cause
7 · Autocracy, Inc.19 Autocracy, Inc. · 20 Exit, voice, and institutional arbitrage
Midterm review · study guide, terms 1 and 9

Two classifications

V-Dem, Regimes of the WorldLinz and Stepan 1996
Typesclosed autocracy · electoral autocracy · electoral democracy · liberal democracydemocracy · authoritarianism · totalitarianism · post-totalitarianism · sultanism
Dimensionsfree and fair multiparty elections; a winner constrained by courts, legislature, and protected rightspluralism · ideology · mobilization · leadership
Figureelectoral autocracy: 3.8 billion peoplewithout the two added types, more than 90 percent of nondemocracies in one box
Midterm review · study guide, terms 11–14

Capitalism, order, and growth

TextClaimDetail
Friedman 1962markets separate economic power from political powercapitalism: necessary, not sufficient, for political freedom
Olson 1993a stationary bandit has an “encompassing interest” in his domain’s outputshort time horizon; succession
Acemoglu & Robinsonliberty needs a strong state and a society able to shackle itRed Queen: both must keep running
Martínez 2022reported GDP against night-time lightsautocracies overstate yearly growth by about 35 percent
Midterm review · study guide, Part B

Four essay questions

  1. Explain the logic of a spin dictatorship. Why would a dictator give up mass violence, and under what conditions does spin work better than fear? Apply the model to one case it fits and one case it does not.terms 9, 10, 15–17
  2. What is the nature of economic growth under dictatorship?terms 10–15
  3. Has globalization made autocracy weaker or stronger?terms 1, 3, 4, 6, 8, 15, 17, 19, 20
  4. Are Africa’s recent coups evidence that Africans are turning against democracy?terms 1, 4, 17, 18
Midterm review

Outline one answer

Pairs · 5 minutes: choose one of the four questions. Write a four-line outline. Name the readings and one piece of evidence for each line.
Next

Thursday and after

Extra · Depth · Logvinenko 2021

Global Finance, Local Control

“…financial internationalization allowed local elites to raise capital from foreign investors while maintaining control over local assets. They legitimized their wealth using Western institutions, but they did so on their terms.”
“…without strong domestic rule-of-law protections, financial internationalization entrenches oligarchic capitalism and strengthens authoritarian regimes.”
1 / 37