DWA 227 · Week 6 · Tue Sep 29, 2026

Coups and Juntas in Africa, 2020–2026

TextTopicKey term
Ero & Mutiga 2024Causes of the 2020s coups“Coups Are a Symptom—Not the Cause—of Political Dysfunction”
Opalo 2024Contagion and risk“autocratization through elections”
Elischer 2022Mali after the coup“two interconnected pillars”
Geddes, Wright & Frantz 2014Regime type and how autocracies endpersonalist regime
Olson 1993 (Week 4)Where order comes fromstationary bandit

Olson, APSR 87(3), 1993 · Geddes, Wright & Frantz, Perspectives on Politics 12(2), 2014 · Ero & Mutiga, Foreign Affairs 103(1), 2024 (subtitle) · Opalo, Journal of Democracy 35(2): 93–107, 2024 (abstract) · Elischer, OECD West African Papers No. 36, Jul 2022

Opening · Mali, 2026

“Are jihadists pushing Mali to the brink?”

▶ BBC News Africa video

50% · 29% · 17%
Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger: shares of the Sahel’s militant Islamist fatalities, 2025 (Niger: 7% in 2023)
78%
of Sahel fatalities linked to JNIM, the al-Qaeda-affiliated coalition
305
fatalities in Benin, the deadliest year on record (+76%); JNIM’s first claimed attacks in Nigeria

Video: “Are jihadists pushing Mali to the brink?” BBC News Africa, YouTube. Figures: Africa Center for Strategic Studies, “Widening Militant Islamist Threat,” 2026 (reporting year to mid-2026; likely undercounts).

Part I · Order

1993 and 2026

Mancur Olson, 1993
Government for large groups arises “not because of social contracts or voluntary transactions of any kind, but rather because of rational self-interest among those who can organize the greatest capacity for violence.”Olson 1993: 568
Capt. Ibrahim Traoré, Burkina Faso, 2026
Ibrahim Traoré, 2023
“People need to forget about the issue of democracy.”

“We have to tell the truth: democracy isn’t for us.”State TV roundtable, Apr 2, 2026

▶ Traoré on social media: YouTube Short

Olson 1993: 568. Traoré: Reuters, Apr 3, 2026 (via ThePrint); also Democracy Now!, Apr 6, 2026. Photo: Lamine Traoré / VOA, 2023, public domain. Video: “Captain Ibrahim Traore ‘4yrs’ in power, Burkina Faso vs Yoweri Museveni ‘40yrs’ in power, Uganda,” FireOne USA, YouTube Short (user-made, not a news source).

Part I · Order · coups, Aug 2020 – Sep 2026

Coups in Africa since 2020

TanzaniaW. SaharaDem. Rep. CongoSomaliaKenyaSudanChadSouth AfricaLesothoZimbabweBotswanaNamibiaSenegalMaliMauritaniaBeninNigerNigeriaCameroonTogoGhanaCôte d'IvoireGuineaGuinea-BissauLiberiaSierra LeoneBurkina FasoCentral African Rep.CongoGabonEq. GuineaZambiaMalawiMozambiqueeSwatiniAngolaBurundiMadagascarGambiaTunisiaAlgeriaEritreaMoroccoEgyptLibyaEthiopiaDjiboutiSomalilandUgandaRwandaS. SudanMali2020 · 2021GoïtaNiger2023TianiChad2021DébySudan2021BurhanGuinea-Bissau · 2025 · N’TamGuinea · 2021 · DoumbouyaBurkina Faso · 2022 · TraoréBenin · Dec 2025 · failedGhanaGabon · 2023 · OliguiMalawiMadagascar · 2025RandrianirinaJunta in powerCoup leader since electedCivil war since Apr 2023Military-led transitionFailed attemptAmb. Palmer’s posts
Coup attempts in Africa, by decade
18 of 21
coup attempts worldwide since 2020 were in Africa (11 of 13 successful); Niger’s failed attempt of Aug 28–29, 2026 not counted

Powell & Thyne, Global Coups dataset, v. Aug 29, 2026 (jonathanmpowell.com/coups); own tabulation; Africa = COW 400–626 + Egypt; 2020s = Jan 2020–Aug 2026. Status: Al Jazeera, Africanews, Crisis Group, 2024–26. Map: Natural Earth.

Part I · Order · public opinion

“Armed forces may take over government when elected leaders abuse power for their own ends”

“African citizens’ apparent support for military juntas seems to signal public fatigue with failed elites, not a distaste for democracy.”Ero & Mutiga 2024

Share agreeing. Afrobarometer Round 9 (2021/23, 39 countries), African Insights 2024; Round 10 (2024/25, 38 countries), Mattes, Peeraullee & Visser, Policy Paper No. 106, Sep 2026. Averages cover different country sets. Burkina Faso (66%) and Niger (67%): Round 9 only.

Part II · Regime type · Geddes, Wright & Frantz

Three kinds of autocracy

TypeWho rulesOusted leader exiled, jailed, or killedAfter collapse
MilitaryOfficer corps“in between”most likely to democratize
Dominant-partyRuling party37%—
Personalist“one man, military or civilian”69%least likely to democratize
8 years
median life, military and personalist regimes (all autocracies: 14)
“The high probability of facing arrest or death after ouster helps explain why personalist dictators infrequently negotiate their transitions from power.”p. 321

Geddes, Wright & Frantz 2014: 319 (“one man”), 321 (69%, 37%; military dictators “lie in between”), 324 (medians; democratization). Data: 1946–2010.

Part II · Regime type · coup leaders, 2021–2026

From coup to ballot

Mahamat Déby
Mahamat DébyChad
Coup · Apr 2021→Elected · May 2024 · 61%→7-year terms, no limit · Oct 2025
Mamadi Doumbouya
Mamadi DoumbouyaGuinea
Coup · Sep 2021→New constitution · 7-year term · 2025→Elected · Dec 2025 · 86.72%
Brice Oligui Nguema
Brice Oligui NguemaGabon
Coup · Aug 2023→Elected · Apr 2025 · 90.35% (provisional)
Assimi Goïta
Assimi Goïta · MaliParties dissolved May 2025; Jul 2025, 5-year mandate renewable “as many times as necessary”
Ibrahim Traoré
Ibrahim Traoré · Burkina FasoParties dissolved Jan 2026
Abdourahamane Tiani
Abdourahamane Tiani · Niger5-year transition from Mar 2025; parties dissolved

Al Jazeera 5/16/24, 12/30/25, 1/18/26, 1/29/26 · Africanews 7/10/25, 10/4/25, 4/13/25 · France24 7/3/25 · AllAfrica 4/14/25 · Vanguard 3/26/25. Photos, Wikimedia Commons: U.S. State Dept., U.S. Embassy Conakry, VOA (public domain); EC Audiovisual (Oligui), Kremlin.ru (Goïta), CC BY 4.0.

Part II · After the coup · security and Russia

Security and the Russian partner

1% → 43%
Sahel share of jihadi-violence deaths worldwide, 2007 → 2022
9,826
militant Islamist-linked deaths in the Sahel, 2025; 41% of Africa’s total
Aug 2026
failed coup attempt in Niamey; Russia’s Africa Corps helped retake Air Base 101
“First, there is public resentment towards the post-1991 political class and France’s military involvement in the country… Second, there is the security co-operation with Russian mercenaries, which provides the transitionary government with an alternative security partner.”Elischer 2022, on Mali’s junta

1% → 43%: Ero & Mutiga 2024. 9,826: Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2026 (likely undercount, per ACSS). Niger: Al Jazeera, Sep 14, 2026; Foreign Policy, Sep 29, 2026. Elischer, “Populist Civil Society, the Wagner Group, and Post-Coup Politics in Mali,” OECD West African Papers No. 36, Jul 2022, abstract. Wagner left Mali Jun 2025; Africa Corps stayed (ACLED).

Part III · Two readings

Ero & Mutiga and Opalo

Ero & Mutiga, Foreign Affairs, 2024
“Often, civilian rule has meant bad rule, and desperate citizens view military rule as a ready-made alternative.”

“…leaders in fully a quarter of African countries have modified or discarded constitutional term limits to consolidate their own power.”
Opalo, Journal of Democracy, 2024
“While the probability of a coup contagion remains fairly minimal, the region is not immune to forms of democratic erosion that stop short of putschists seizing power.” (p. 100)

“…dissatisfaction with democracy and permissiveness toward military interventions may create the background conditions for autocratization through elections.” (p. 105)

Pairs, 4 min: Where do the two readings disagree? Which side does the 2024/25 Afrobarometer round (slide 5) support?

Ero & Mutiga, “The Crisis of African Democracy,” Foreign Affairs 103(1), 2024 (EBSCO text). Opalo, “The Truth About Africa’s Coups,” Journal of Democracy 35(2): 93–107, 2024, pp. 100, 105.

Synthesis

The texts, this week’s cases

TextKey termCases this week
Olson 1993stationary banditMali, Burkina Faso, Niger: juntas in power, parties dissolved
Geddes, Wright & Frantz 2014personalist regimeChad, Guinea, Gabon: coup leaders elected; term rules rewritten in Chad and Guinea
Ero & Mutiga 2024“Symptom—Not the Cause”Guinea (president seeking to stay in office), Gabon (rigged election), Mali and Burkina Faso (jihadist violence)
Opalo 2024“autocratization through elections”55% tolerate military takeover when leaders abuse power (Afrobarometer 2024/25)
Elischer 2022“two interconnected pillars”Mali: popular resentment of the old political class and France; Wagner, then Africa Corps

Sources as on slides 1–9.

1 / 10
↓ / space to advance